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## THE RELATION OF ECONOMICS TO SOCIOLOGY. 117

thus : "It is, the soldier's duty to defend the country; the pastor's, to teach it; the physician's, to keep it in health; the lawyer's, to enforce justice in it; the merchant's, to provide for it. . . . The merchant rather than fail in any engagement or consent to any deterioration, adulteration or unjust and exorbitant price of that he provides, he is bound to meet fearlessly any form of distress, poverty or labor, which may, through maintenance of these points come upon him. . . . And as the captain of a ship is bound to be the last to leave his ship in case of wreck, and to share his last crust with his sailors in case of famine, so the manufacturer in any commercial crisis is bound to take the suffering of it with his men, and even to take more of it for himself than he allows his men to feel, as a father would in a famine, shipwreck or battle, sacrifice himself for his son."

The trust of the future will be considered richest that supports the greatest number of comfortable and happy homes ; the merchant prince will be one who exercises the widest helpful influence over the lives of others.

JEROME DOWD.

*Trinity College (N. C.).*

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## THE RELATION OF ECONOMICS TO SOCIOLOGY.

The present is a period of transition for the social sciences. The social philosophy of the eighteenth century had such a hold on the thinking world of the first half of the present century that few systematic efforts have been made to displace it by a new philosophy more in harmony with present conditions. This old social philosophy was divided into two distinct parts—utilitarianism and political economy. The first, as its name shows, was a theory of utility, the second was in essence a theory of goods ; that is, a theory of material wealth and of the objective conditions which determine its production and increase.

I have shown elsewhere \* that this division of social philosophy into utilitarianism and political economy is artificial and unsatisfactory, and that these two are really one science having two roots, one in the objective and the other in the subjective world. We have then a pure science of economics dealing with the elementary forces belonging to the theories of goods and utility, and a concrete science of political economy dealing with the phenomena of modern industrial societies. I use the term "political economy" in an old sense as the economy of men in a political society. Certain political regulations and social instincts are assumed as facts in political economy that do not belong

\* "The Scope of Political Economy," *Yale Review*, Nov., 1893.

to the theories of goods and utility. If the forces treated of in the theories of utility and goods were the only forces influencing the choices of men, a true society could not be formed. The relations existing between them would be merely those of an economic aggregate, where external conditions and internal desire alone determine the conduct of each individual.

Between the general science of economics and the concrete science of political economy lie the social sciences, a field dealing with the forces neglected by the older social philosophers, but demanding attention at the present time because of the gap created by the strict demarcation of the field occupied by the theories of utility and goods. This failure of the old social philosophers to explain the complex phenomena of the present social world through the meagre premises of their philosophy has caused the sociologists to take a revolutionary attitude toward the work of their predecessors, and to seek to place their new science antecedent to it. A conflict has thus arisen which must be decided before further progress can be made.

It is true that no other economist has conceived of economics in exactly this manner, yet I have in no way departed from the spirit of their work, nor have I done violence to the established usage of economic terms. I have merely adjusted the use of these terms to the needs of to-day, and I have tried to restore the broader meanings which were in use before the Ricardian epoch. If, however, we accept the thought of Professor Giddings and place sociology antecedent to economics, we give to the words "social" and "association" a new meaning opposed to all usage, and also confuse two concepts which must be kept distinct.

In marking off the field of sociology there lies the same confusion of thought that formerly lay in economic discussions due to the confusion of pure economics with concrete political economy. In the one sense sociology treats of the phenomena due to the occupation of a common environment by several individuals—the phenomena of mere contact in a physical environment. In the other sense sociology treats of the phenomena resulting from certain subjective feelings which bind men together. In the first sense, hostile men or a beast and its prey are parts of one society and "associate" with one another. In the second sense, only friendly bonds create a society. It is a relation existing between a number of similar beings united for common ends. The one is the phenomena of hostile contact, the other that of friendly contact. Professor Giddings calls both these classes of phenomena "social," and treats them\* as though they were co-ordinate phenomena belonging to one science. Evolution of "the good old way" of

\* "Utility, Economics and Sociology." ANNALS, vol. v, p. 86, November, 1894.

survival through conflict is grouped together with that secured through such bonds as those which bind a mother to her child.

It is plain that the phenomena of hostile contact are among the first phenomena of life. The problem is to classify them properly. I do not think that they belong to the theory of society or even to the theory of utility, but to the theory of goods. The fly is merely a good to the spider. The various objects about the spider are either goods or indifferent objects. The fly belongs to the former class, and thus becomes an object of desire. The spider wants contact—so as to convert the fly into a good. The fly recognizing the spider merely as an evil wants to avoid contact. No other relations exist between them. Yet these simple relations cause an evolution in both the spider and the fly. The least active and most stupid flies are caught by the spiders. The least active and most stupid spiders fail to secure enough flies to keep them alive. This simple evolution belongs to the theory of goods and does not demand a conscious recognition of other facts than that objects of interest are either goods to be secured, or evils to be avoided.

Professor Giddings speaks of a theory of physiological utility, but this theory to my mind is nothing more than the theory of goods. The fact that a relation between an object and an organism creates an advantageous change within the organism makes the object a good to the organism. The relation can be viewed as well from the side of the object as from that of the organism. Thus the theory of goods will explain all the facts of these simple relations and the term "utility" can be reserved for the feelings which arise in higher beings.

The changes in organisms which hostile contact creates, make them more conscious of feelings of utility and thus bring them under the influence of the theory of utility. The increased wariness of flies or the increased competition of spiders for food increases the activity of surviving spiders and thus increases the intensity of pleasure which the possession of food gives. Hostile contact thus promotes the growth of intense feelings and gives to isolated beings an intense initial desire for the goods they consume. There is therefore no need of a bond of union between similar organisms to create the most intense feelings in isolated individuals. Intense initial utilities precede the true social feelings by a period too long to make it possible to treat the two as though they were co-ordinate facts.

Even if it were admitted that all organisms surviving at the present time have social instincts and are influenced by their fellows, it would not disprove my theory of the order in which different activities develop. It must not be forgotten that the higher organisms of to-day

are not the descendants of the present lower organisms. While both are the descendants of common ancestors these common ancestors did not have all the qualities of any living species. All types of animal life may need social instincts to survive under new conditions and yet the earlier organisms, living when the struggle for existence was not so fierce, could have prospered without any social bonds. The need of union would come only when intense feelings goaded the enemies of a species to such a degree that extinction would follow if new methods of defence were not devised. The mere influence of hostile contact would in time force progressive animals into a social state.

There are, however, at the present time many organisms which have not acquired any social instincts. There are in these cases no enduring bonds between males and females or between the mother and the offspring. To such creatures all objects of interest are goods or evils. They are conscious of no other distinctions than those recognized in the theory of goods. A recent observer of serpents describes the cobras in the following manner. "The baby cobras," he says, "had no more knowledge of or affection for their mamma than if she were an old tree root or something inanimate lying in their way and troublesome to be climbed over. Nor would the mother take the slightest notice of her interesting family. Indeed some of them she never saw at all." Yet the cobra has considerable intelligence and manifests strong feelings when aroused to activity. If isolated individual organisms of this type can survive at the present time without a trace of social instincts, it is easy to see how millions of generations could have passed away before organisms began to associate for common ends and learn of each other through suggestion and imitation.

But, it is asked, how do these hostile individuals, conscious only of their own wants and of the differences in the quality of goods, become aware of the presence of other conscious beings and conclude to become social? The answer to this question is not difficult if we look for a solution among those objective conditions that determine a progressive evolution. The objects that are goods to each species are unequally distributed throughout the environment. The stronger animals of each species secure for themselves the localities where these goods are most abundant. The weaker animals are forced thereby into unfavorable localities where their food is scarce. They must, therefore, resort to new means to secure it or perish. They find this means in co-operation, and thus new relations grow up between them that are absent from the stronger animals which occupy the better localities where individual exertion can secure the needed food. Social bonds at first arise not among the victors but among the vanquished. They are the means by which the vanquished outwit

their conquerors. Social relations begin with indirect activities. New motives are created when one being recognizes another as a means to an end. A friendly feeling springs up between two beings when each one regards the presence of the other as a condition to the satisfaction of his desires. An enemy of the presocial state becomes a means in the social state and is thus preserved from destruction.

The social forces are a check to immediate consumption and to those activities which prompt immediate consumption. Time knowledge and an appreciation of time relations must precede any of the social activities. A being must be able to contrast the present and the future and have self-control enough to put a period of non-consumption before consumption. There must be pleasures of anticipation as well as those of realization. The motives that would prompt the destruction of a fellow creature are held in check and new feelings of pleasure are aroused by the fact that the presence of a comrade is an index of future consumption. As soon as consumption by direct means becomes impossible or even improbable, the feeling of pleasure which the possession of food affords is transferred to the means by which it is to be secured.

The social feelings are but a developed type of a large class of feelings due to the love of means by which ends are attained. The hunter loves his dog and gun, the herder his cattle, the mechanic his tools, the farmer his lands, the merchant his business and the lawyer his profession. Animals love their master or the persons who feed them; they even have an affection for the place and time which are associated in their minds with the presence of those on whom they depend. There is, therefore, nothing peculiar about the rise of social feelings as soon as beings are placed in a position where they must resort to indirect methods to satisfy their wants. They are sure to accompany the psychical development which makes indirect action possible.

The perception of time relations leads to a new concept—that of self or personality. The passing feelings of different periods are united into one group and contrasted with the enduring element in all experience. When this concept becomes definite the being is able to infer the existence of other enduring beings through groups of phenomena similar to that created by his own actions. Certain actions thus become the index of mental qualities and the recognition of similar beings becomes possible. Suggestion and imitation grow up through further study of the relation of acts to their effects. The more successful individuals of a group become models to be imitated by comrades. These new activities and the resulting instincts strengthen the tendency to use means for securing ends and bring

similar beings into such intimate relations that conscious social forces can arise.

When these social forces have once become strong enough in individuals to check their hostile feelings, and thus enable them to co-operate for common purposes, the process of evolution is materially modified. Not only can the socially strong through co-operation secure a living in the poorer portions of the environment where isolated individuals would perish, but also when united they become powerful enough to displace the unsocial members of their species who, through their individual strength, have occupied better portions of the environment. However powerful an isolated being may be, he cannot withstand the encroachments of a group of weaker but united beings. When, therefore, social feelings appear in any group, they force the growth of social feelings in all the groups with which they come in contact. The power of surviving lies with the more compactly united social groups.

This opposition between the less social but stronger members of one group and the more social but weaker members of other groups shows itself in all stages of social development. It is the basis of the contrast between static and dynamic societies. A group of individuals push themselves into an environment for which they are peculiarly fitted, and through their adjustment to these local conditions become static. The weaker in this local struggle escape to some other locality, which, in the judgment of the static group, is not so good as the first locality. Here the second group becomes dynamic, and develops new social feelings through which their productive power is increased. The new environment is, in this way, made better than the old one, and the second group also acquire the power to displace the first group in the region where they formerly had an advantage. Under these new conditions the second group tends to become static, and thus pave the way for the rise of a new social group with stronger dynamic tendencies. Social progress is a series of such upheavals, and as a result it becomes a continuous process.

If this position is correct, it is not difficult to map out the order of the various social sciences. There are three groups of forces operating in any complete society: the physical forces that come from the objective environment and create the theory of goods; the desires that form the basis of the theory of utility; and the social forces that unite men for common purposes, and lead each one to regard the others as means to ends. By studying each of these forces in isolation, we create three hypothetical sciences, in each of which there is a hypothetical man whom we assume to be influenced in his actions by only one of these forces. First of all, we have the hypothetical

physical man—the slave of physical conditions—who is perhaps best described by Buckle in his "History of Civilization;" then we have the economic man, familiar to all students of economic literature; and, finally, the social man—the ideal of socialism—who feels no other motives than those which spring from the feelings which unite men in the most advanced societies. Following these studies, and based upon their conclusions, comes a concrete realistic science to which the name sociology could well be given, as its field corresponds more closely to that outlined by sociologists than to any other field. At any rate, they must choose between making their science a hypothetical science, dealing with the theory of social forces, and a realistic science dealing with the aggregate phenomena of the social world.

Professor Giddings does not recognize this distinction. He defines sociology as an "attempt to account for the origin, growth, structure and activities of human society by the operation of physical, vital and psychical causes, working together in a process of evolution."\* Here he evidently has in mind a concrete realistic science treating of all the phenomena of human society. On page 18, however, he says that "sociology may be defined as the science of social elements and first principles." Here I understand him to refer to the hypothetical science dealing with the social forces. That this is his meaning becomes plain on page 36, where he describes sociology as "a special, differentiated branch of psychology." As the first definition made sociology include the physical and vital causes as well as the psychical, the latter science cannot be more than a part of the first. A branch of psychology cannot give us more than a theory of tendencies from which we can determine what a hypothetical social man would do under certain circumstances. To determine the actions of the actual inhabitants of our social world, we must blend together the results of these forces with those coming from the economic and physical world.

Whether economics is a "social" science or not depends upon the definition of the term. If the word is used in a narrow sense, meaning by it the phenomena due to the subjective forces which bind men together and make them love and trust one another, economics is not a "social" science. If, however, "social" be used in a broad sense, and made to include all the phenomena of a human society living in a common environment, economics is a "social" science. Much of the phenomena of such societies are due to the economic forces operating in them, and no explanation would be valid which neglected the economic factors.

SIMON N. PATTEN.

*University of Pennsylvania.*

\* "The Theory of Sociology," p. 9.